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Professor McCall contends that two particular trial court decisions in the 
Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate ("KSBE") controversy "play havoc with 
attorney-client and trustee-beneficiary relationships ... ."1 The two decisions 
that concern Professor McCall so greatly were rendered by different judges in 
separate actions. One has to do with the attorney-client privilege,2 the other 
with conflicts of interest.3 Each of these two decisions reflects basic trust law 
principles and was properly made. 
This Reply begins with a brief overview of relevant trust law principles in 
Part I. Part II then describes the decisions that trouble Professor McCall and 
the context of each. Part m critiques Professor McCall's analysis and 
conclusions. The Reply then suggests, in Part IV, a framework for resolving 
the underlying issues. 
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University of Denver College of Law. 1974; LL.M. University of Miami School of Law, 1975. 
Professor Roth co-authored the Broken Trust essay that is widely believed to have played a role 
in the removal and resignation of trustees of the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate. The 
author appreciates the assistance of Hawai 'i State Deputy Attorney General Hugh R. Jones in 
the preparation of this Article. 
I James R. McCall, Endangering Individual Autonomy in Choice of Lawyers and Trustees 
-Misconceived Conflict of Interest Claims in the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate 
litigation. 21 U. HAw. L. REv. 487, 489 (1999). 
2 See id. at 492-94; see also Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Trial Court Order 
(Stayed) Following Hearing by Order of Hawaii Supreme Court, In re Estate of Bishop. Equity 
No. 2048. at 10-12 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Jan. II, 1999)(stating in Conclusion of Law No.7 that the 
"attorney employed by a fiduciary for an estate ... represents the fiduciary as client as defined 
in Rule 503(a) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence." (quoting HAW. PROD. R. 42(a»(internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
3 See McCall. supra note I. at 494-95; see also Minute Order Regarding Trustees Oswald 
Stender and Gerard Jervis' Petition for Approval of Voluntary Recusal with Respect to Pending 
Tax Audit and for Appointment of a Panel of Special Administrators with Respect to Pending 
Tax Audit and Trustees' Petition for Instructions and Approval of Appointment oflRS Dispute 
Advisory Panel. In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Feb. 4. 1999) 
[hereinafter Minute Order]. 
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I. SELECfED TRUST LAW PRINCIPLES 
A trust is a relationship between trustees and beneficiaries, not a separate 
entity.4 Unlike a corporation, for example, a trust cannot own assets, conduct 
business or hire lawyers. 
To illustrate: $6 billion of trust corpus, including stock in Goldman Sachs 
and approximately 370,000 acres of land in Hawai'i, is not owned by KSBE 
... it is KSBE. What sometimes is called trust corpus, or the trust estate, is 
owned by trustees. 
Trustees have the power (though not the right) to do just about anything 
they want to do with the trust estate.s The potential for abuse is obvious and 
is the reason why trust law imposes strict fiduciary duties on trustees, 
including a duty of undivided loyalty to the interests of the beneficiaries.6 
Trustees' use of trust funds to serve their own personal interests is strictly 
forbidden.7 
Trustees, acting in their fiduciary capacity, often hire lawyers to assist in 
the administration of the trust estate. It is both logical and appropriate for 
these lawyers to be paid with funds from the trust estate and that they be 
called "Trust Counsel," meaning simply that they do legal work that is directly 
related to the administration of the trust and that is intended to serve the best 
interests of the trust beneficiaries. The ~lients are the trustees, but the 
trustees' duty of undivided loyalty prevents them from using such lawyers in 
any way that would put their personal interests ahead of those of the 
beneficiaries. Trust Counsel, so defined, are said to represent trustees in the 
trustees' "representative" or "fiduciary" capacity. 
It also is possible for trustees to retain counsel primarily to further the 
trustees' personal interests ("Personal Counsel"). This sometimes happens in 
reaction to, or anticipation of, an action against trustees by, or on behalf of, 
4 See REsTATEMENI' (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959)(stating that "a trust is a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to property is held 
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of [others]."); see also 1 AuSTINW. 
SCOTI & FRATCHER, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 2.3 (4th ed. 1987); Ronald C. Link, Developments 
Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration lAwyer: The Effect of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 REALPRoP. PROD. & TR. J. 1, 60 (1 99 l)("[A] trust 
... is not generally regarded in law as a separate juristic entity."); Ziegler v. Nickel, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 312 (Ct. App. 1998)(holding that a trust is not an entity separate from its trustees). 
5 See UNIF. TRUSTEES' POWERS Acr § 3(c) (1964), 7B U.L.A. 764 (1985); HAW. REv. 
STAT. § 554A-3(c) (1993). 
6 See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 
543 (2d rev. ed. 1991); see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)("[T]he 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive ... is ... the standard of behavior [of the trustee]."); 
Ahuna v. Department of Hawaiian Homelands, 64 Haw. 327, 340, 640P.2d 1161, 1169 (1982). 
7 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 6, § 95. 
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trust beneficiaries. Such lawyers mayor may not be paid out of trust funds 
initially. The cost of a trustee's Personal Counsel in the context of a dispute 
involving the trust ultimately should be borne by the losing party (i.e., a 
trustee who initially uses personal funds to pay such a lawyer is entitled to full 
reimbursement upon prevailing; a trustee who initially uses trust funds to pay 
such a lawyer must fully reimburse the trust estate upon failing to prevail). A 
trustee's Personal Counsel is said to represent trustees in their "personal," 
"individual," or "nonrepresentative" capacity.8 
Attorney-client privilege generally applies to communications between 
attorneys and their clients, including when the clients are trustees or other 
fiduciaries.9 But because the privilege frustrates the search for truth, its use 
"must be strictly limited to the purpose for which it exists."lo That purpose 
is to encourage candid communications. Trustees seeking advice from their 
Personal Counsel need the assurance of confidentiality provided by the 
privilege. In the case of trustees seeking legal advice from Trust Counsel, 
however, there is no need to encourage candid communications. Trustees 
have a duty to be fully forthcoming when discussing trust administration with 
such lawyers, and also when responding to beneficiaries who want informa-
tion reasonably needed to hold trustees accountable. l1 In short, trustees 
8 Whether a lawyer is representing a trustee in that trustee's representative or individual 
capacity should be made clear by the lawyer. In the absence of an explicit agreement to the 
contrary, a lawyer initially paid with trust funds generally.is presumed to be representing the 
trustee in the trustee's representative capacity. Lawyers initially paid from the trustee's own 
funds generally are presumed to be representing that trustee in that trustee's individual capacity. 
See generally AC1EC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODELRUUlS OFPRoFESSIONALCONDUcr (3d 
ed. 1999) [hereinafter AClECCOMMENTARIES]. 
9 See HAW. R. EVID. 503 
10 DiCenzo v. Izawa, 68 Haw. 528, 535, 723 P:2d 171, 175 (l986)(quoting Dike v. Dike, 
448 P.2d 490, 496 (Wash. 1968». 
II See, e.g., United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999)(holding that a 
trustee may invoke the federal common-law attorney-client privilege against beneficiaries when 
the trustee "retains counsel in order to defend herself against the ... beneficiaries," but not 
when the ''trustee seeks an attorney's advice on a matter of [trust] administration and where the 
advice clearly does not implicate the trustee in any personal capacity .... "); Comegys v. 
Glassell, 839 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Tex. 1993)("[T]he Court holds that no independent 
attorney-client privilege exists between a trustee and its attorney to the exclusion of the 
beneficiaries when the alleged privileged documents relate to the administration of the trust or 
the trusts' res."); Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 140 F.R.D. 291, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)("Insofar 
as the trustee is consulting an attorney to assist him in providing adequate service to the trust, 
and hence to its beneficiaries, the trustee cannot shield those communications from the 
beneficiaries."); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591,595 (Cal. 2000)("In 
most of the other jurisdictions in which this question has arisen, courts have given the trustee's 
reporting duties precedence over the attorney-client privilege."); Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter 
v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205, 214 (Ct. App. 1985)("[D]ecisions in California and in 
other states, as well as commentators, have adopted the rule that the trustee's fiduciary duty of 
514 University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 21:511 
"cannot subordinate the fiduciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries to their 
own private interests under the guise of attomey-client privilege.,,12 
Trustees are required to avoid conflicts of interest. 13 When conflicts 
develop, trustees must act in the best interests of the beneficiaries.14 If the 
conflict is great, trustees may be required to step aside temporarily or even 
permanentIy:'s Should they not do so voluntarily, a court of competent 
jurisdiction can order them to step aside.16 Any such decision should be based 
on the best interests of the beneficiaries, not the personal interests of the 
trustees. 17 
full disclosure to the trust beneficiaries extends to all contents of the trustee's file concerning 
trust administtation matters affecting the trust interests of the beneficiaries."); In re Estate of 
Baker, 528 N.Y.S.2d470, 473 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1988)(,'This court is of the opinion that a fiduciary 
has an obligation to disclose [to beneficiaries] the advice of counsel with respect to matters 
affecting the administtation of the estate .... "); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 173 & cmt 
b (stating that a trustee generally must furnish "complete and accurate information[,]" but the 
trustee is ''privileged to refrain from communicating to the beneficiary opinions of counsel 
obtained by him at his own expense and for his own protection."); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE LAw GoVERNING LAWYERS § 134Acmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 11996)("Inlitigation 
between a trustee of an express trust and beneficiaries of the trust charging breach of the 
trustee's fiduciary duties, the trustee cannot invoke the attomey-client privilege to prevent 
beneficiaries from introducing evidence of the trustee's communications with a lawyer retained 
to advise the trustee in carrying out the trustee's fiduciary duties."); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra 
note 6, § 961 (''The beneficiary ... has a right to obtain and review legal opinions given the 
trustee to enable the trustee to carry out the trust, except for such opinions as the trustee has 
obtained on his own account to protect himself against charges of misconduct."); 2A SCOTT & 
FRATCHER, supra note 4, § 173 ("A beneficiary is entitled to inspect opinions of counsel 
procured by the trustee to guide him in the administtation of the trust"); Rust E. Reid et aI., 
Privilege and Confidentiality Issues When a Lawyer Represents a Fiduciary, 30 REAL PRoP. 
PROD. & TR. J. 541,560 (1996)("[T]he general trend is for courts to permit, at a minimum, 
discovery [by beneficiaries] of attomey-client communications generated in the ordinary course 
of administering the trust."); Robert W. Thttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in 
Fiduciary Representation, 1994 Iu.. L. REV. 889,940 (1994)("As a number of courts have 
found, when counsel is employed at the trust's expense, communications between a trustee and 
counsel are not privileged against discovery by the trust beneficiaries."). 
11 Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A2d 709, 714 (Del. Ch. 1976). 
13 See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 6, §§ 394, 541, 543. 
14 See id. § 543. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. § 527 
17 See In re Estate of Holt, 33 Haw. 352, 355-57 (1935). The Hawai'i Supreme Court in 
Holt stated: 
A court of equity may and will remove a trustee who has been guilty of some breach of 
trust or violation of duty. The exercise of this function by a court of equity belongs to 
what is called its sound judicial discretion and is not controlled by positive rules except 
that the discretion must not be abused. 
Id. at 357 (quoting Gaston v. Hayden, 73 S.W. 938, 941 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903». In Holt, the 
court permanently removed a trustee on the basis of the master's report, for lack of stewardship 
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ll. THE KSBE DECISIONS CRITICIZED BY PROFESSOR MCCALL 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Decision 
Following the publication of the "Broken Trust" essay, the five KSBE 
trustees individually retained separate Personal Counsel to represent their 
respective individual interests. Together, the five trustees unanimously agreed 
to retain various Trust Counsel to assist them in their capacity as trustees in 
dealing with the Attorney General's investigation, master's inquiry, Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") audit, and related matters. Whereas 
Trust Counsel conferred with all five trustees from time to time and were paid 
with trust funds, 18 Personal Counsel conferred only with each one's respective 
and lack of mutual confidence between trustees. 
It is evident that the relations between the trustees were not amicable and that there was 
a lack of mutual confidence. This should not be overlooked in determining whether the 
court below abused its discretion in removing [the trustee]. There is nothing in the record 
which reflects on his honesty or impugns his integrity. There is much, however, from 
which the court could reasonably have inferred that [the trustee] was not sufficiently 
careful and diligent in the performance of his duties to meet the requirements of good 
stewardship. 
Id. at 362. 
18 Trust Counsel sometimes described their client(s) by naming the individual trustees or 
by referring collectively to "the trustees," but at other times they said they represented "KSBE," 
''the trust" or ''the trust estate." For example, Trust Counsel William McCorriston in various 
pleadings claimed to be attorney for the "Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop, Richard S.H. Wong, 
Marion Mae Lokelani Lindsey, Henry Peters, Gerard Jervis and Oswald Stender," "the trustees 
in their capacity as trustees ofKSBE," and "the Board of Trustees of the Kamehameha Schools 
Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate." Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Attorney General to 
Compel Obedience to Subpoena 97-83 (the Lindsey Subpoena), Bronster v. Wong, S.P. 97-
0520, at 4, 5 (Haw. Cir. Ct., 1st Cir. Oct. 20, 1997); Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Filed January 29, 1998, Filed March 
12,1998, Burgertv. Estate of Bishop, Civ. No. 97-01637 HG, at cover page (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 
1998); Stipulation to Stay All Trial and Discovery Proceedings, Medeiros v. Estate of Bishop, 
Civ. No. 98-00082 HG, at 1 (D. Haw. Oct. 9, 1998). In a single 1999 petition, this same 
attorney characterized his representation three different ways: "Attorney[] for Trustees under 
the Will and of the Estate of Bernice Pauahi Bishop"; and attorney for Trustees Wong, Peters, 
and Lindsey "acting as a majority of the Board of Trustees"; and "counsel for the Board of 
Trustees." Trustees' Emergency Ex Parte Petition for Stay of Order Re: IRS Audit Pending 
Disposition of Appeal and/or Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 
2048, at 1 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Feb. 18, 1999); Declaration ofWilliamC. McCorriston of 2117/99, 
In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048, at 1 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Feb. 18, 1999). 
A different Trust Counsel, Robert Bruce Graham, repeatedly indicated that his clients 
were the five trustees and that there is no such thing as a trust entity. The following is a typical 
example: "[Outside Counsel] MR. GRAHAM: There is no entity as KSBE. It's a trust estate, 
Your Honor. I represent the trustees." Partial Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable 
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individual client. Personal Counsel were paid by either their respective client 
or KSBE's errors and omissions insurance carrier. Two of the trustees (the 
minority trustees) instructed Trust Counsel to cooperate fully with the various 
investigations, but the other three (the majority trustees) directed Trust 
Counsel not to cooperate fully. From that point forward, Trust Counsel 
followed instructions from the majority trustees.19 In-house attorneys for 
KSBE (General Counsel) also took orders from the majority trustees during 
this period of time. 
In the context of an action by the minority trustees to remove one of the 
majority trustees, the minority trustees asked the trial court to disqualify Trust 
Counsel, arguing that these lawyers had clients (i.e., various trustees) on 
opposite sides of the controversy. 20 The minority trustees also asked that the 
majority trustees not be allowed to use attorney-client privilege to prevent 
Trust Counsel and General Counsel from testifying about matters relating to 
trust administration.21 Professor McCall at that time argued as an expert 
witness against the minority trustees' attempt to disqualify Trust Counsel, and 
against the minority trustees' efforts to elicit testimony from Trust Counsel 
and General Counsel.22 Professor McCall consistently has stressed that Trust 
Counsel and General Counsel had but one client, an entity known as "the 
Bambi Weil, Judge, Presiding, on December 21, 1998,1n re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048, 
at 2 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Dec. 21, 1998). 
19 According to Trustee Oswald Stender, Trust Counsel sometimes ignored his requests and 
failed to communicate with him even' though Stender considered himself a client of Trust 
Counsel. See Declaration of Oswald Kofoad Stender of 212'lJ99, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity 
No. 2048, at 1-2 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Feb. 23, 1999). The existence of an attorney-client 
relationship generally is based on the reasonable beliefs of the client, not on the basis of what 
the attorney thinks. See Otaka, Inc. v. Klein, 71 Haw. 376,383,791 P.2d 713,717 (1990); 
Butler v. State Bar, 721 P.2d 585, 589 (Cal. 1986); In re McGlothlen, 663 P.2d 1330, 1334 
(Wash. 1983). The Hawai'i Supreme Court stated in Otaka: "Legal consultation occurs when 
the client believes that he is approaching an attorney in a professional capacity with a manifest 
intent to seek professional legal advice. Thus, the deciding factor is what the prospective client 
thought when he made the disclosure, not what the lawyer thought." Otaka, 71 Haw. at 383, 
791 P.2d at 717 (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Developments in the Law-
Conflicts 0/ Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1244, 1322 (1981». 
20 See, e.g., Petitioner-Defendant Oswald Kofoad Stender's Motion to Compel Respondent-
Plaintiff Marion Mae Lokelani Lindsey to Produce Documents and to Appear for Her 
Disposition, In re Estate o/Bishop, Equity No. 2048, at 8 (Haw. Prob. Ct. May 12,1998). 
21 See Discovery Master's Order Granting Motion to Compel Deposition of Nathan Aipa, 
In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048, at 2 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Oct. IS, 1998). 
22 See Declaration of James R. McCall in Support of Trustees ' Supplemental Memorandum 
in Opposition to Petition of Trustees Oswald Kofoad Stender and Gerard Aulama Jervis' 
Petition to Disqualify William C. McCorriston, Darolyn Lendio and the Law Firm of 
McCorriston Miho Miller Mukai Filed on March 4, 1999, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 
2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. March 8,1999). 
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trust. ,,23 Two trial courts disagreed. Citing basic principles of trust law, both 
courts ruled that the trustees as fiduciaries were the clients.24 Since trustees 
effectively were suing each other, a joint-client exception to the attomey-
client privilege rule applied.2.5 
B. The Conflict of Interest Decision 
The minority trustees argued in a separate action that all five trustees had 
a conflict of interest in dealing with the IRS.26 The IRS had been auditing 
KSBE for some years, and it generally was believed that KSBE's tax-exempt 
status was in jeopardy, especially if the trustees continued in office.27 Also, 
the five trustees faced exposure to intermediate sanctions imposed by the 
Service.28 Such action by the IRS would result in the trustees not only having 
23 Professor McCall's arguments are detailed in his article herein. See McCall, supra note 
I, at 497-501. Attorneys of record for the Majority Trustees principally relied on two cases to 
support their use of the entity theory: Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc. v. City of Atlantic City, 
624 A.2d 102 (N.J. 1993), and United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840 (B.D.N.Y. 1978). 
See, e.g., Objection to Trustees Oswald Kofoad Stender and Gerald Aulama Jervis' Petition to 
Disqualify William C. McCorriston, Darolyn Lendio and the Law Firm of McCorriston Miho 
Miller Mukai, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048, at II, 12-15 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Feb. 23, 
1999). The attorneys cited Greate Bay for the proposition that a trust may be considered an 
"entity" under MODELRUUlS OFPROFESSIONALCONDUcr Rule 1.13, and De Lillo as "the only 
case truly on point." See id. But the trust at issue in Greate Bay was a "business trust," which 
is "not a trust in the ordinary sense of holding and conserving property but rather is a device for 
the conduct of a business." Greate Bay, 624 A.2d at 104. Indeed, that Court noted that 
business trusts are expressly excluded from the scope of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts. 
See id. at 105. 
De Lillo concerns the criminal prosecution of the former chairman of a union pension 
fund. See De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. at 841. Delillo cites absolutely no authority for its blanket 
statement that "there is no logical or policy reason for treating a Board of Trustees any 
differently than a corporation[,1" see id. at 842, even though such a statement flies in the face 
of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF'l'RuSTS, §§ 2-
16 (l959)(defining trusts, and see particularly section 16A, distinguishing charitable 
corporations from trusts). De Lillo then transposes, word for word, the holding of a corporation 
case into the trust law context. See De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. at 842-43 (quoting In Re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, Detroit, Mich., Aug. 1977,434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (B.D. Mich. 1977». 
24 See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text. 
25 See HAW. R. EVID. 503(d)(6). 
26 See Minute Order, supra note 3, at 5. 
27 See Order Regarding Order to Show Cause Regarding Special Purpose Trustees' Report 
and Order to Show Cause Regarding New CEO Based Management System, In re Estate of 
Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Prob. Ct. May 7, 1999), available at <http://starbulletin.coml 
1999/05/07/news/removal.html>. 
28 See Stephen G. Greene, Trwtees of Hawaii's Wealthiest Charity Make Changes to Quell 
Criticism, CHRON. PHnANTHRoPY, Jan. IS, 1998, at 39; Stephen G. Greene, Bishop Estate to 
Pay IRS $9-Million but Retain Its Tax-Exempt Status, CHRON. PHnANTHRoPY, Dec. 16,1999, 
at 32. 
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to pay a substantial penalty to the IRS, but also being forced to reimburse the 
trust estate for any "excess benefits," such as trustee compensation that might 
be determined by the IRS to have been unreasonably high.29 
Mter reviewing 2,500 pages of relevant materials and considering the 
recommendation of a three-person panel, the trial judge found that the five 
incumbent trustees had a conflict of interest that was "actual, apparent, 
adverse and material.,,30 He then appointed five special-purpose trustees to 
represent KSBE interests in the IRS audit.31 
m. PROFESSOR MCCALL' S FLAWED ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. The Anomey-Client Privilege Decision 
Professor McCall cites Rule 1.13 of the Hawai'i Rules of Professional 
Conduct for the proposition that attorneys retained by trustees to represent 
them in their fiduciary capacity really have but one client, the trust entity.32 
29 See I.R.C. § 4958 (Supp. II 1996), effective with respect to excess benefit transactions 
occurring on or after September 14, 1995. Prior to the enactment of section 4958 ("intennediate 
sanction"law), upon discovering trustee abuse at a public charitable trust, the IRS could revoke 
the charity's tax exempt status, or do nothing. See D. Alexander Ritchie, Intermediate 
Sanctions: Controlling the Tax-Exempt Organization Manager, 18 VA. TAX REv. 875,881 
(1999). The only available sanction-revocation-harmed blameless beneficiaries of the charity 
and not the trustees who had abused their position of trust. See id. at 876. The intennediate 
sanction law, which was passed unanimously in both the House and in the Senate, empowers 
the IRS to sanction insiders who have abused the trust. With this option available to it, the IRS 
is highly unlikely to revoke the tax-exempt status of any viable public charity, at least not so 
long as it has reason to believe that the abuse will not continue. See H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 
59 n.l5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143,1182 n.15. 
The intermediate sanctions law empowers the IRS to assess a 25% penalty on trustees 
who recefve an "excess benefit," such as excessive compensation. See I.R.C. § 4958 (Supp. II 
1996). The charitable trust benefits by not losing its tax-exempt status and because any such 
"excess benefit" must be repaid to the trust. For example, if a trustee received compensation 
of $900,000 for a year when reasonable compensation to that trustee would have been only 
$100,000, that trustee will have to pay an intennediate sanction of $200,000 to the IRS (25% 
of the $800,000 excess benefit) and pay back the entire $800,000 excess benefit to the trust 
estate. 
The KSBE trustees reportedly spent nearly $1 million of trust funds unsuccessfully 
fighting the enactment of intennediate sanctions law and attempting to lessen its potential 
impact on them. See Petition of the Attorney General on Behalf of Trust Beneficiaries to 
Remove and Surcharge Trustees, for Accounting, and for Other Equitable Relief, In re Estate 
of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 (Haw. Prob. O. Sept. 10, 1998), available at 
<http://starbulletin.coml98/09/11/newslremoval.html>. 
30 Minute Order, supra note 3, at 6. 
31 See id. at 8. 
32 See McCall, supra note I, at 498-99. 
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His position is that only the trust (and not individual trustees) can waive the 
privilege, and that such decisions are properly made by majority vote of the 
trustees. The rule he cites basically says that attorneys hired by agents of an 
organization to represent interests of the organization have but one client, the 
organization.33 But neither Rule 1.13 nor its companion comments mention 
trusts, much less suggest that they are "organizations." As big a departure 
from the common law as it would be to start treating trusts as organizations 
rather than relationships, one would expect the question to be addressed. That 
it is not suggests that Professor McCall's interpretation was not intended or 
even anticipated when the rule was adopted. 
Professor McCall then states that Rule 503 of the Hawai'i Rules of 
Evidence "explictly adopts the entity theory.,,34 But this rule simply defines 
a client as "a person ... or ... organization or entity ... who is rendered 
professional legal services by a lawyer ... . ,,3S Nowhere in the rule or 
companion comments is it even suggested that a trust is a person, organization 
or entity. 
Professor McCall then quotes Hawai'i Probate Rule 42(a): "An attorney 
employed by a fiduciary for [a] ... trust represents the fiduciary as client as 
defined in Rule 503(a) of the Hawaii Rules of Evidence and shall have all the 
rights, privileges, and obligations of the attorney-client relationship with the 
fiduciary[,]" and suggests that the word fiduciary in this context refers to a 
trust entity, rather than trustees.36 A close look at the comments to Rule 42, 
however, demonstrates that the drafting committee used the word fiduciary to 
describe a natural or juridical person responsible for the administration of a 
trust estate, not the trust estate itself.37 
Professor McCall also incorrectly states that commentators and modem 
appellate opinions ''uniformly adopt" the entity theory. 38 The theory has other 
proponents, and at least one court has adopted it, but Professor McCall is 
simply wrong when he suggests it currently is the favored approach,39 and that 
33 See HAW. RULES OFPROfESSIONALCONDUcr Rule 1.13. 
34 McCall, supra note I, at 499. 
35 HAW. R. EVID. 503(a)(1). 
36 McCall, supra note I, at 499. 
37 HAW. PROB. R. 42 commentary ('''The fiduciary must be conscious of the difference 
between personal actions and fiduciary actions. For example, an attorney could not represent 
a fiduciary with respect to the administration of a trust and also represent that same individual 
... [if it] would present a conflict of interest."). 
38 See McCall, supra note I, at 498. 
39 An overwhelming majority of authorities conclude that the fiduciary is the attorney's 
client. See, e.g., Coverdell v. Mid-South Farm Equip. Ass'n, 335 F.2d 9, 12~15 (6th Cir. 
1964)(holding that a trust cannot sue or be sued, but rather, legal proceedings are properly 
directed at the trustee); Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 595 (Cal. 
2000)(noting that the "suggestion that the trustee 'is not the real client' of the attorney retained 
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his interpretation and application of the theory have been embraced by many 
others.40 Professor McCall also is mistaken in thinking that a Hawai'i 
Supreme Court opinion has adopted and applied the entity theory.41 
by the trustee directly contradicts California law .... " (citation and internal quotation maries 
omitted)(quoting United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999»; Ziegler v. Nickel, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312, 314 (Ct. App. 1998)(stating that a trust "is not an entity separate from its 
trustees." (internal quotation marks omitted»; In re Estate of Gory, 570 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (PIa 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990)(noting that "in florida, the personal representative is the client rather than 
the estate or beneficiaries." (internal quotation marks omitted»; Wagner v. Lamme, 386 N. W.2d 
448, 450 (Neb. 1986)("Attorneys represent people. There is no such position known as 
'attorney of an estate."'); Roberts v. Fearey, 986 P.2d 690, 694 & n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 
1999)("[W]e hold that, when an attorney undertakes to represent a fiduciary, he or she 
represents only the fiduciary ... We have found only one case holding that an attorney hired 
by the trustee represents the estate and not the trustee."); Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins, 859 
S.W.2d 617, 623 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)(finding "considerable authority" that an estate or trust 
cannot be represented, as it is ''oot a legal entity that can sue or be sued."); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) (stating that a trust is a "relationship"); ACfEC 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 8, at 211 ("[A] minority of cases and ethics opinions have adopted 
the so-called entity approach under which the fiduciary estate is characterized as the lawyer's 
client. However, most cases and ethics opinions treat the fiduciary as the lawyer's client .... "); 
John R. Price, Duties o/Estate Planners to Non-Clients: Identifying. Anticipating and Avoiding 
the Problems, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1081 (1996)(noting that "a majority of the cases and 
ethics opinions aU consider the fiduciary to be the lawyer's client-not the fiduciary estate or 
its beneficiaries."); Tuttle, The Fiduciary's Fiduciary, supra note 11, at 927 (observing that 
"[t]he entity theory represents a novel departure from the law in nearly all jurisdictions .... "); 
but see Stein way v. Bolden, 460 N. W.2d 306, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)( concluding that, under 
the Revised Probate Code of Michigan, "although the personal representative retains the 
attorney, the attorney's client is the estate, rather than the personal representative."). 
40 Professor Jeffrey N. Pennell, an advocate of the entity approach, has acknowledged that 
it has "little direct precedential support[,]" and that it was specifically rejected by an ABA Study 
Committee "as lacking sufficient support in the law." Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representation 
Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1319, 1334, 1355 (1994). 
Unlike Professor McCall, Professor Pennell's conception of an entity approach generally 
expands rather than limits the level of protection afforded trust beneficiaries. 
Under the entity approach, each trust entity acts through an "agent" ... but the attorney 
ultimately is responsible to the entity and its constituents ... rather than to the agent who 
hired the attorney. Moreover, the attorney is authorized to disclose otherwise confidential 
information to constituents of the entity [i.e., beneficiaries] on an "as needed" basis. This 
alternative has not been considered by many courts--probably because of the historical 
notion that ... a trust has no legal existence. . .. This approach ... is somewhat novel 
Id. at 1334. "As perceived in this manner, the fiduciary who hired the attorney ... is merely 
another agent of the true client (the entity) and could not, for example, dismiss the attorney in 
an effort to cover up any wrongdoing." Id. at 1336. 
41 See McCall, supra note 1, at 499-501. In Richards v. Midkiff, 48 Haw. 32,40-41,396 
P.2d 49, 55 (1964), the Hawai 'i Supreme Court merely adopted the universal rule ''that multiple 
trustees can only act as a unit .... " Specifically, the court stated that ''the determination of 
whether the trust estate should maintain a legal action requires the requisite concurrence of the 
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Though it does not go to his central point, Professor McCall's 
mischaracterization of another Hawai 'i authority should not go unchallenged. 
Specifically, he asserts that "HPR Rule 42(c) provides that the attorney for a 
trust ... has an independent duty to infonn the probate court if the attorney 
'knows' of the commission or possible commission of a crime that could 
injure the truSt."42 That is his characterization of the rule. Here is the 
language of the rule itself: 
An attorney for an estate, guardianship, or trust is an officer of the court and 
shall assist the court in securing the efficient and effective management of the 
estate. The attorney ... shall have an obligation to bring to the attention of the 
court the nonfeasance of the fiduciary.43 
There is a world of difference between the "nonfeasance of the fiduciary ," as 
stated in the rule, and the "commission of a crime," as the rule is described by 
Professor McCall. And one can only wonder why he would emphasize that 
the attorney must actually know about wrongdoing. The rule itself does not 
use that word. In fact, attorneys are required by Rule 42(c) "to monitor ... 
and to ensure that required actions [are taken).'t44 
Professor McCall expresses concern that the trial court's decision 
effectively eliminates the attorney-client privilege whenever trustees sue one 
another, and that this will prevent effective representation of trustees: "Unless 
rejected, the trial court ruling will force fiduciaries to avoid any type of 
confidential communications with [Trust Counsel)."4s But this ignores that 
individual trustees always are free to retain Personal Counsel with their own 
funds (and sometimes with funds from the trust estate) to watch out for their 
personal interests. Each of the five KSBE trustees did exactly that.46 
Unsurprisingly, Personal Counsel were never called upon to testify about 
communications with their respective clients. Presumably, each individual 
trustees,just as the exercise of any other power." Id. at 41,396 P.2d at 55 (citations omitted). 
On March 8, 1999, the Hawai'i Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus filed on behalf of 
the majority trustees following Judge Weil's ruling that Trust Counsel represented five trustees 
rather than one entity. See Order Denying Petition, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 2048 
(Haw. S. a. Mar. 8, 1999). 
42 McCall, supra note I, at 502 (emphasis added). 
43 HAW. PROB. R. 42(c). 
44 Id. Perhaps Professor McCall confused Rule 42(c) with Rule 42(b), which imposes a 
duty on trust counsel ''to notify ... beneficiaries . .. of activities of the fiduciary actually known 
by the attorney to be illegal .... " Id. 42(b) (emphasis added). 
4' McCall, supra note 1, at 504. 
46 Personal Counsel were not paid directly from the trust estate. However, much of their 
fees were paid by KSBE' s insurance carrier pursuant to a "cannibalizing" policy (amounts paid 
to lawyers reduced coverage protection to KSBE). 
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trustee was candid when conferring with his or her respective Personal 
Counsel. 
Trust Counsel are supposed to be working for the ultimate benefit of 
beneficiaries, not the personal interests of trustees. The attorney-client 
privilege has no place in a lawsuit by beneficiaries, or by a co-trustee on 
behalf of beneficiaries, where the attorney in question was retained as Trust 
Counsel. 
B. The Conflict of Interest Decision 
Professor McCall claims that a judge found conflicts of interest requiring 
the appointment of special-purpose trustees despite "no evidence relevant" to 
the conflict claim.47 The judge's order in that matter indicates otherwise.48 
Furthennore, Professor McCall neglects to mention the implications of a 
Hawai'i statute and rule that enables the court to appoint special-purpose 
trustees once a conflict has been found. Hawai'i Revised Statutes section 
554A-5(b) states, "H the duty of the trustee and the trustee's individual 
interest ... conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power may be 
exercised only by court authorization ... .'049 This means that the court must 
get involved once a conflict of interest has been established. A panel 
composed of a master, General Counsel, and KSBE's long-time tax counsel, 
after reviewing 2,500 pages of relevant materials and conferring with senior 
IRS personnel, unanimously found an "actual, apparent, adverse and material" 
conflict, and recommended the appointment of special-purpose trustees to 
represent KSBE interests in the IRS audit.5O Hawai'i Probate Rule 56(e) 
provides for appointment of special administrators, such as the special-
purpose trustees, where a conflict of interest arises or a fiduciary cannot or 
should not act for any other reason. SI 
47 McCan, supra note 1, at 504. 
41 See Minute Order, supra note 3. The Minute Order stated: "Based on the IRS Forms 
5701 ... the Court finds ... that actual, adverse and material conflicts of interest exist between 
the individual interests of Trustees of the Trust Estate ... and the interests of the Trust Estate 
with respect to the claims and issues raised in the IRS Forms 5701" Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
The court also relied on the findings and recommendations of the master. 
49 HAw. REv. STAT. § 554A-5(b) (1993). 
50 Report of the Master Pursuant to the Order Adopting Recommendation No. 18 of the 
Master's Consolidated Report on the 109th, 11 Oth, and 111 th Annual Accounts of the Trustees 
Filed on October 21, 1998, and the Order Adopting Amended Recommendation No. 22 of the 
Master's Second Supplemental Report on the One Hundred Ninth, One Hundred Tenth, and 
One Hundred Eleventh Annual Accounts of the Trustees, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 
2048, at 6 (Haw. Prob. Ct. Jan. 21,1999). 
51 See HAw. PROB. R. 56(e). 
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There also is case-law support in Hawai 'i for appointing additional trustees. 
In the case of In re Estate oflkuta.52 the Hawai'i Supreme Court appointed an 
additional trustee over the objection of the sole incumbent trustee. The 
Supreme Court noted that there was a conflict between the sole trustee and the 
beneficiaries. and held: "[W]e find that the lower court was empowered to 
'appoint additional trustees. and not merely fill vacancies by appointment. 
when the circumstances are such that the appointment of such additional 
trustees would be conducive to the better administration of the trust .... S3 It 
should be remembered that the special-purpose trustees were appointed to 
represent KSBE interests in the IRS audit at a time when the Attorney 
General. acting as parens patriae. was calling for the permanent removal of 
incumbent trustees who appeared to have lost the trust of many key parties. 
including the IRS.54 
Professor McCall has overreacted to a fact-driven decision. According to 
him. this particular conflict of interest ruling means that any trustee now can 
be forced to the sidelines by any third party who "asserts that the trustee, 
acting on behalf of the trust. committed a mistake or wrongful act for which 
the trust or the trustee could be held liable ... S5 As if this possibility is not 
shocking enough. he then extends it to every claim against a trust. whether or 
not a trustee is personally implicated: "[A]ny assertion of a claim against a 
trust by a third party would result in the limited removal of the trustees, as 
long as it is possible to imagine a theory on which the trustees might have 
52 64 Haw. 236, 639 P.2d 400 (1981). 
53 Id. at 248, 639 P.2d at 408 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 108 cmt. e 
(1959». 
54 See, e.g., Letter from Terry Franklin, Chief. EPIEO Division Western Key District and 
Marcus Owens, Director, Exempt Organizations Division of the IRS, to Interim Trustee Robert 
K.U. Kihune, Aug. 19, 1999 (copy on file with author). This letter states: 
Id. 
Due to fundamental concerns about whether the Incumbent Trustees would effectively 
implement any agreement that would be entered into between the Service and 
Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate (KSBB), the Service required, as a precondition to 
entering into Closing Agreement negotiations with KSBB and as an alternative to 
continuing with administrative revocation procedures, that steps be taken to permanently 
remove the Incumbent Trustees from their positions as Trustees of KSBB. In coming to 
this decision, we have relied upon evidence in our administrative files that indicates that 
the Incumbent Trustees have a history of ignoring Probate Court Orders, Master Report 
recommendations, Probate Court Stipulations, and the advice of independent experts 
whose opinions were sought out by KSBB at great expense to KSBB, relating to activities 
which impact KSBB's exempt status. In addition, we have relied upon evidence that 
indicates the Incumbent Trustees have a history of pursuing activities which are 
inconsistent with furthering KSBB's exempt purpose. 
55 McCall, supra note I, at 505. 
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ultimate liability to the trust for the claim.,,56 According to Professor McCall, 
a trustee would be prevented from defending a lawsuit where "a trust 
employee allegedly operates an automobile in a negligent manner while on 
trust business, thereby causing an accident that injures a third party."S7 
This radical departure from current law, according to Professor McCall, is 
the logical consequence of the court in this KSBE case finding a conflict of 
interest and appointing special-purpose trustees. But, the court did not act 
simply because a claim of wrongdoing had been asserted. The court's 
decision reflected its evaluation of specific claims, including the potential 
impact on the interests of the trust beneficiaries. It should be remembered 
that the IRS was at that time contemplating the revocation of KSBE's tax-
exempt status, a move that would have reduced the trust estate by $750 
million, or more. It also is relevant that a master had already found dozens of 
serious breaches of trust,S8 and that in Hawai'i, a master's report has the 
weight of a jury's verdict. S9 
It is difficult to take seriously Professor McCall's statement that the 
interests of the trustees and the trust beneficiaries were "actually identical, 
rather than conflicting.,,60 Perhaps he has not considered the implications of 
the federal intermediate sanctions law. That 1996 legislation was not 
mentioned in his declaration that was submitted to the court by the majority 
trustees, nor was it cited in his article. For example, by arguing that they had 
not paid themselves unreasonably high compensation, the trustees would be 
arguing against reimbursement to KSBE of an "excess benefit." 
56 Id. at 506. 
57 Id. at 506 n.98. 
58 See Master's Consolidated Report on the One Hundred Ninth, One Hundred Tenth, and 
the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Accounts of the Trustees, In re Estate of Bishop, Equity No. 
2048 (Haw. Prob. Q. Aug. 7, 1998), available at <http://starbulletin.coml98J08/07/newsl 
masters2lmasters2.html>. 
59 In Monting v. Leong Kau, 7 Haw. 486 (1888), the Hawai'i Supreme Court stated: 
The settled practice of courts of equity is to regard the report of a Master upon questions 
of fact referred to him as having substantially the weight of the verdict of a jury, and his 
conclusions are not to be set aside or modified without clear proof of error or mistake on 
his part. 
Id. at 487; see also In re Estate of Baker, 34 Haw. 263, 267-68 (l937)(holding that a master's 
report on questions of fact will not be set aside or modified absent clear proof of error). 
60 McCall, supra note I, at 508. 
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IV. A BE'ITER WAY TO FRAME THE IsSUES 
A. The Conflict Decision 
Trustees should not automatically be removed simply because someone has 
accused them of wrongdoing. When, however, the stakes are high and 
trustees have a serious conflict of interest, a court of competent jurisdiction 
should do whatever it determines to be in the best interests of the trust and 
trust beneficiaries. In short, a judgment call must be made. 
Trustees with a conflict of interest are not legally entitled to continue to act 
on behalf of the trust without regard to the nature of the claim or the 
seriousness of the conflict. Common sense alone suggests that some conflicts 
are simply too great. For example, if a trust is owed money by a trustee who 
recently put his assets in his spouse's name, should that trustee be the one to 
decide on behalf of the trust whether to accuse himself of a fraudulent 
transfer? This extreme example of a conflict simply points out that a line has 
to be drawn somewhere, by someone. The judge is the best person in such 
cases to draw the line, and the judge in the KSBE situation made what 
appears to be a reasonable decision, especially in light of the three-person 
panel's findings and recommendation. Even if Hawai'i did not have a statute 
explicitly calling for court involvement once a conflict of interest has been 
determined, and a rule authorizing the appointment of special purpose 
trustees, the court would have been justified in responding as it did to the 
minority trustees' petition. In fact, this particular court had the power and 
responsibility to remove the trustees permanently on the basis of the master's 
report or conflict among the trustees, and to take such action sua sponte.61 
B. The Privilege Decision 
Trust Counsel in the KSBE controversy were determined by two separate 
trial court judges to have multiple clients (the five trustees), rather than a 
single client (the trust entity).62 As a result, the joint-client exception to the 
applicable attorney-client privilege rule prevented three of the joint clients 
from using the privilege to withhold attorney-client communications from the 
other two joint clients of those attorneys. If the judges instead had adopted 
Professor McCall's entity approach, the three-trustee majority would have 
been able to assert the privilege. In Professor McCall's words, this is because 
the trust entity "must be directed by the majority ofthe Board [oftrustees].,,63 
61 See In re Estate of Holt, 33 Haw. 352, 355-57 (1935). 
62 See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text. 
63 McCall, supra note I, at 498. 
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Under this thinking, the trust entity remains constant as individual trustees 
come and go and the makeup of the controlling majority changes. This 
suggests that no trustee, not even one who currently is part of the controlling 
majority of a multi-trusteed trust, can safely rely on the privilege being 
available when it is "needed." 
If a trustee wants to know that the privilege will be his or hers individually 
to assert, that trustee must retain Personal Counsel, not Trust Counsel. If a 
trustee uses personal funds and clearly documents that the representation is 
to be of the trustee in the trustee's individual capacity, and if the attorney is 
not involved in the administration of the trust, then the privilege clearly will 
be' available. If one or more of these factors is missing, there will be some 
degree of doubt. In such cases, trustees should give serious thought to 
petitioning the court for instructions. 
What this suggests is that any debate about the trust as a relationship or an 
entity misses the main point. When a lawyer is hired by a trustee, the 
important question is "what role is this lawyer playing?"64 If the lawyer is to 
be paid out of trust funds, that suggests (but does not fmally determine) that 
64 ACfEC COMMENl'ARIES, supra note 8, at 55-56. The Commentaries provide: 
Representation of Fidllcwry in Representalive Not Individutd Capacity. If a lawyer is 
retained to represent a fiduciary generally with respect to the fiduciary estate, the lawyer 
represents the fiduciary in a representative and not an individual capacity-tbe ultimate 
objective of which is to administer the fiduciary estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries. 
Giving recognition to the representative capacity in which the lawyer represents the 
fiduciary is appropriate because in such cases the lawyer is retained to perfonn services 
that benefit the fiduciary estate and, derivatively, the beneficiaries-not to perfonn 
services that benefit the fiduciary individually. The nature of the relationship is also 
suggested by the fact that the fiduciary and the lawyer for the fiduciary are both 
compensated from the fiduciary estate .... 
General and Individual Representation Distinguished. A lawyer represents the fiduciary 
generally (i.e., in a representative capacity) when the lawyer is retained to advise the 
fiduciary regarding the administration of the fiduciary estate or matters affecting the 
estate. On the other hand, a lawyer represents a fiduciary individually when the lawyer 
is retained for the limited purpose of advancing the interests of the fiduciary and not 
necessarily the interests of the fiduciary estate or the persons beneficially interested in the 
estate. For example, a lawyer represents a fiduciary individually when the lawyer, who 
mayor may not have previously represented the fiduciary generally with respect to the 
fiduciary estate, is retained to negotiate with the beneficiaries regarding the compensation 
of the fiduciary or to defend the fiduciary against charges or threatened charges of 
maladministration of the fiduciary estate. 
Id.; see also Hoopes v. Carota, 531 N.Y.S.2d407, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), afJ'd, 543 N.B. 
2d 73 (N.Y. 1989). The court distinguished representation in the trustee's representative 
capacity from representation in his individual capacity and stated that disclosure might not have 
been required had the trustee established ''that he solicited advice from counsel solely in an 
individual capacity and at his own expense, as a defensive measure regarding potential litigation 
over his disputes with the trust beneficiaries." Id. at 410 (citations omitted). 
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the lawyer will be involved in the administration of the trust and therefore is 
representing the trustee in the trustee's representative capacity. If the lawyer 
is paid out of the trustee's personal funds, that suggests (but does not fmally 
determine) that the lawyer will be watching out for the personal interests of 
the trustee, not involved in the administration of the trust, and is therefore 
representing the trustee in the trustee's individual capacity. Lawyers should 
not accept an assignment from a trustee without first making sure that all key 
parties understand the nature of the relationship and the implications. In some 
cases, this will include notification to the beneficiaries. Such relationships do 
not need to be of the "one-size-fits-all" variety. So, for example, if the lawyer 
and the trustees want to create a relationship more or less patterned after a 
corporate or entity model, that clearly can be done. 
The traditional treatment of a trust as a relationship rather than an entity 
can lead to some hair-pulling situations in the case of a multi-trusteed, 
wheeling and dealing trust like KSBE. For example, anyone trustee 
effectively can disqualify or waive the attorney-client privilege with respect 
to Trust Counsel, even when the majority disagrees. That can be chaotic. But 
rather than contend that the law of corporations applies to trusts, or even to 
argue that it should apply (i.e., that the entity approach should be embraced), 
lawyers and commentators should recognize that traditional trust law and 
typical codes of ethics make possible the crafting of customized relationships 
that fit perfectly the parties' needs and expectations. This fact and its 
implications is stated beautifully by Professor John Price in the Reporter's 
Note to the ACTEC Commentaries: 
Anticipating and Avoiding Conflicts. This edition ... continues to emphasize 
the advantages to clients and lawyers of anticipating and attempting to avoid 
potential problems . . .. Estate planners not infrequently encounter difficult 
problems of professional responsibility, particularly ones involving confidential-
ity and conflicts of interest. Serious problems can often be reduced or 
eliminated by advance discussion and planning. In particular, in many instances 
uncertainties regarding the lawyer's duty of confidentiality can be eliminated 
with sufficient advance planning and consent. Disclosure and agreement may 
also allow the same lawyer to represent the interests of multiple parties who 
have somewhat conflicting interests, but not clients whose interests are seriously 
adverse, such as adverse parties in litigation.65 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the following "Comment on Professor Roth's Reply," Professor McCall 
states that positions expressed in this Reply are based on two premises: (1) 
65 AClEC COMMENTARIES, supra note 8, at 7-8. 
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"that trustees do not need and should not enjoy the benefits of the attorney-
client privilege," and (2) "that a court may properly announce and rely upon 
any ground" to remove an allegedly unfit trustee.66 This is misleading. As 
stated herein, trustees do sometimes need the protection of, and may properly 
rely upon, the attorney-client privilege. The point made and emphasized 
herein, is that trustees in such situations should retain Personal Counsel, not 
Trust Counsel.67 This Reply is equally clear that no trustee ever should be 
removed simply on the basis of an allegation of wrongdoing.68 
In addition to distinguishing positions actually taken from ones alleged to 
have been taken, readers might consider the roles played by many lawyers and 
jurists in the KSBE controversy. For example, the now-former KSBE trustees 
were selected by state supreme court justices, seemingly on the basis of 
politics rather than merit. That is troubling. The selection of justices 
themselves seems to have been inextricably intertwined with the selection of 
trustees,69 and justices who picked trustees regularly decided cases in which 
those same trustees were parties.70 That it took so many years even to begin 
to hold wayward trustees accountable suggests something less-than-compli-
mentary about Hawai'i's probate judges and attorneys general, especially 
when one realizes that many of the most egregious breaches of trust had been 
public knowledge for years. That justices of the Hawai'i Supreme Court 
could seemingly ignore judicial ethics and their own fiduciary duties for so 
long, and then avoid completely any measure of accountability, also makes 
66 James R. McCall, Comment on Professor Roth's Reply, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 531 (1999). 
67 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
68 See supra p. 525. 
69 Members of Hawai 'i' s Judicial Selection Commission are appointed by the President of 
the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, and the 
Governor. Recent appointments to the KSBE Board of Trustees include a President of the 
Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the Hawai'i Supreme Court, and a Governor's 
closest advisor (who also happened to be a chairman of the Judicial Selection Commission just 
prior to his KSBE appointment). See Samuel King, Msgr. Charles Kekumano, Walter Heen, 
Gladys Brandt & Randall Roth, Broken Trust, HONOWW STAR-BUIJ..ETIN, Aug. 9, 1997, at B-
I, reprinted in Appendix C to this issue of the University of Hawai 'i Law Review. Another 
former chairman of the Commission admitted to having asked candidates for the supreme court 
how they might go about appointing a KSBE trustee if a vacancy were to occur while they were 
a sitting justice. See id. The law firm of that former chairman, incidentally, received more than 
$15 million in legal fees from KSBE over the years following his service on the Commission. 
The law firm of the former Governor who appointed all five of the current justices also received 
millions in legal fees. See id. 
70 See Hazel Beh, Why the Justices Should Stop Appointing Bishop Estate Trustees, 21 U. 
HAW. L. REv. 659, 661 (1999). KSBE trustees have been parties in litigation in front of the 
supreme court on the average of nearly once per year. Eventually, the justices agreed to stop 
deciding cases involving the trustees they selected. See Ian Lind & Harold Morse, 5 Justices 
Step Aside in Estate Inquiry, HONOWW STAR-BUIJ..ETIN, Mar. 12, 1998, at A-I. 
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one wonder about Hawai 'i' s political milieu and its impact on the state system 
of justice. 
ID short, readers might appropriately wonder how the situation could get so 
bad, and go on for so long, despite a theoretically sound system of account-
ability. 
